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The Impact of Venture Capital on Governance Decisions in 
Collaborations with Start-ups  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article addresses solutions for contractual 
hazards in the formation and operation of 
collaborations with start-ups. We suggest that 
venture capitalists may serve as a mechanism to 
mitigate contractual hazards and act as a substitute 
for equity sharing in joint ventures. This article is to 
our knowledge the first to address the impact of 
venture capital (VC) on governance decisions for 
start-ups. We analyze 5405 bilateral collaborations 
from the SDC database for the period 2009-2014, 
and find that VC-backed firms are less likely to 
share equity in collaborations.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades a growing body of 
literature has emerged examining the role 
of venture capital in the formation, 
operation and evaluation of strategic 
alliances (Hsu 2006; Lindsey 2008; Wang 
et al. 2012). The growth of this literature 
on venture capital in strategic alliances 
largely reflects the observed challenges of 
inter-firm collaboration, such as 
uncertainty, information asymmetry and 
asset intangibility, and which have been 
addressed by studies on venture capitalists 
(VCs) (Kaplan and Lerner 2014). These 
challenges have been experienced by new 
firms, but increasingly also established 
firms undergoing radical restructuring have 
benefitted from the involvement of venture 
capitalists (Wright and Robbie 1998; Ning 
et al. 2015). 
This body of literature comes from, at 
least, three different streams; one with an 
interest in the different roles venture 
capitalists may have (Baum and Silverman  
2004; Colombo and Grilli 2010); one with 
a focus on the hazards involved in inter- 
firm collaboration (Oxley 1997; Oxley and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a subset of 564 VC-backed firms, start-ups are 
less likely to choose a joint venture as a governance 
structure in comparison to established firms. When 
firms are backed by a larger number of venture 
capitalists, they are also less likely to share equity 
in a collaboration. This article improves our 
understanding of the effect of VC on governance 
decisions in inter-firm relations, and presents 
evidence of a trade-off between joint venture equity 
and VC equity in the formation of collaborations. It 
also shows that this trade-off becomes even more 
substantial when syndication of venture capitalists 
is present. 
 
 
Sampson 2004)); and one in which VC- 
backed start-ups are engaged in strategic 
alliances (Colombo et al. 2006; Hsu 2006).  
This study contributes at the intersection of 
these three streams of literature, examining 
the influence that venture capital has on 
the governance structure of strategic 
alliances, in particular when one of the 
partners in the inter-firm collaboration is a 
start-up firm. In one stream of this 
literature, some authors have argued that 
venture capitalists contribute substantially 
to the formation of strategic alliances, by 
exploiting their ability to pick the winners 
(e.g. Baum and Silverman 2004; Colombo 
et al. 2006; Colombo and Grilli 2010). 
Others have argued that venture capitalists 
have the expertise and the network to 
improve the operation of the alliance, by 
offering advice or replacing management 
(e.g. Hellmann and Puri 2002). Also the 
reputation and valuation of the alliance 
have been connected to the involvement of 
venture capital, leading to smaller under-
pricing of VC-backed IPO’s compared to 
non-VC-backed IPO’s (e.g. Hsu 2006; 
Wang et al. 2012). We acknowledge that 
venture capitalists may do all of the above, 
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but this article focuses on the effect 
venture capitalists may have on the 
efficient formation and operation of 
alliances, and the choice for a governance 
structure as a defining factor of efficiency 
in inter-firm relations.  
In a second stream of the literature, inter-
firm collaborations have been observed to 
be hazardous endeavours, running serious 
risks due to incomplete contracts and weak 
property rights (Williamson 1996; Oxley 
1997), and consequently being exposed to 
opportunistic behaviour. This is most 
apparent in R&D alliances and in alliances 
involving start-ups, in which the hazard of 
leakage of sensitive and strategic 
information has been reported to lead to 
opportunistic behaviour (Sampson 2007). 
These hazards in inter-firm collaboration 
have been discussed extensively in terms 
of governance adaptations, with evidence 
of firms choosing safeguards in the form of 
equity in joint ventures (Oxley and 
Sampson 2004). Some authors have argued 
that venture capitalists can also relieve the 
consequences of incomplete contracts and 
mitigate opportunistic behaviour among 
alliance partners, e.g. by introducing 
sanctions and retaliations (Lerner 1994; 
Colombo et al. 2006). For instance, 
Colombo et al. (2006) argue that venture 
capitalists may provide a shield against 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the 
alliance partners of new technology-based 
firms: “NTBFs can reduce the transaction 
costs of alliance formation including those 
generated by appropriability hazards, if 
they manage to get support from a 
“sponsor” ”(Colombo et al. 2006, p. 1192). 
We will argue that firms may find 
protective measures against hazards of 
leakage in a trade-off between equity in 
joint ventures and equity supplied through 
the involvement of a venture capitalist and 
clusters of venture capitalists (syndicates). 
A third stream of the literature connects 
the venture capital financing of start-up 
firms with the formation, operation and 
evaluation of strategic alliances. Hsu 
(2006) finds more strategic alliances 
among VC-backed start-ups than among 
those start-ups that are not financed by 
venture capital. This positive relationship 
between venture capital backing of start-
ups and the amount of strategic alliances 
involving start-ups is mainly confined to 
the number of VC firms that are involved 
and not to the total amount of venture 
funding (Wang et al. 2012). This literature 
emphasizes the positive relationship 
between alliance formation and 
syndication of VCs. The advantage for 
start-ups of venture capitalists would lie in 
the shielding of their operations against 
external risks, primarily through a series of 
funding rounds of clusters of venture 
capitalists (Wang et al. 2012). We will 
therefore argue that venture capital 
backing of firms will replace equity 
sharing in all alliances, but the effect will 
be stronger in alliances involving start-ups 
and in alliances backed up by clusters of 
venture capitalists.   
Our article draws on theoretical insights 
from transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1996; Oxley 1997), along 
with empirical work from financial 
economics on venture capital investments 
(Wright and Robbie 1998; Lindsey 2008) 
to construct testable hypotheses that 
explain the role of venture capital in 
governance decisions of alliances 
involving start-ups. Our paper contributes 
to an emerging literature on strategic 
alliances and venture capital by exploring 
two related research questions: how does 
VC funding affect the choice for equity 
governance of alliances, and how different 
is this for start-up firms?  
We suggest that venture capitalists may 
serve as a mechanism to mitigate 
contractual hazards and act as a substitute 
for equity sharing in strategic alliances. 
Whereas others have suggested alternative 
mechanisms for similar problems (e.g. 
‘steering committees’ (Reuer and 
Devarakonda 2015)), or have suggested 
similar solutions for alternative problems, 
this article is to our knowledge the first to 
address the impact of venture capital on 
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governance decisions for alliances.  
In order to address these questions we 
combine data on alliances from the SDC 
database with data on venture capital from 
Thomson One. We analyze 5405 bilateral 
alliances that were formed between 2009 
and 2014, and find that VC-backed firms 
are less likely to share equity in alliances. 
In a subset of 564 VC-backed firms, start-
ups are less likely to choose a joint venture 
as a governance structure in comparison to 
established firms. Firms that are backed by 
a larger number of venture capitalists are 
also less likely to share equity in a  
collaboration. We control for industry, 
continent and year of the alliance, for 
industry and continent of the firm, and for 
industry focus of the venture capitalist. 
Our results are robust in different contexts, 
such as different geographical regions and 
different types of alliances (R&D vs. non-
R&D alliances). 
The following sections of this article are 
structured as follows. Section 2 combines 
the respective bodies of literature on 
venture capital and strategic alliances to 
construct our hypotheses concerning the 
governance choice of alliances with VC-
backed firms. First, we examine the effect 
of venture capitalists on the choice for 
equity alliances; then, we examine the 
relationship between VC syndication and 
governance choice of collaborations 
involving start-ups. In Section 3 we 
describe the data collection procedure and 
the method adopted. Section 4 presents our 
empirical results. Section 5 summarizes 
our findings, and suggests opportunities for 
future research. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
The motivation for firms to collaborate in a 
strategic alliance has been documented 
extensively (Jolink and Niesten 2012; 
Niesten and Jolink 2015). A diverse set of 
explanations have been developed in the 
literature to explain why firms engage in 
collaboration, how the collaboration can be 
maintained and governed, and what affects 
the performance of the collaboration. The 
explanations have branched out into 
theoretical perspectives as diverse as 
agency theory, property rights theory, the 
resource-based view or transaction cost 
theory (Jolink and Niesten 2012). The 
literature has shown that strategic 
collaboration can reduce agency costs 
(Lafontaine 1992; Combs and Ketchen 
1999; Lafontaine and Slade 2007) or create 
a ‘mutual commitment device’ (Cai 2003). 
Strategic alliances have also been inspired 
by the opportunities offered by the joint 
extraction and creation of value in a 
collaboration (Das and Teng 2000), or by 
the need to safeguard against contractual 
hazards (e.g. opportunistic behavior by a 
contracting party) (Oxley 1997). 
The contractual incompleteness of inter-
firm relations has led to a well-documented 
distinction between equity alliances (joint 
ventures) and non-equity alliances (e.g. 
Hennart 1988; Gulati 1995; Tsang 2000). 
In joint ventures the partners in the 
collaboration contribute equity, and 
therefore ownership claims, to the joint 
venture. In non-equity alliances, the 
collaborations are founded on contracts 
between the alliance partners, such as 
licensing agreements or marketing 
arrangements. There is a consensus in the 
literature that joint ventures are better 
equipped to deal with contractual 
incompleteness, although the reasoning 
may differ. From a property rights 
perspective equity in joint ventures can 
mitigate the hold-up problem created by ex 
post bargaining through a pre-established 
division of benefits (Dasgupta and Tao 
1998). In transaction cost economics, 
alliance partners economize on transaction 
costs when transactions are aligned with 
the governance structure (Williamson 
1991). From this perspective, joint 
ventures possess governance attributes 
such as additional monitoring rights and 
administrative controls that make them 
better safeguards for contractual hazards 
(Oxley 1997).   
Modern corporate finance has entered the 
literature on strategic alliances by 
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documenting the facilitating role of 
venture capitalists in the formation of 
strategic alliances (e.g. Lindsey 2008) or 
IPO’s of alliance partners (e.g. Chang 
2004). Venture capitalists are financial 
intermediaries specialized in investments 
and in syndicating investments with other 
VCs (Wright and Lockett 2003). They 
have been allotted ‘scout’ capabilities, 
identifying potential winners, and ‘coach’ 
capabilities, providing firms with 
additional competences (Baum and 
Silverman 2004; Colombo and Grilli 
2010). A growing number of articles have 
addressed the possible impact of venture 
capital backing on inter-firm 
collaborations. Hsu (2006) finds evidence 
of a correlation between VC funding and 
cooperative activities. Lindsey (2008) 
attains a similar result for US firms, where 
alliances are more frequent among VC-
backed firms, particularly when they share 
a common venture capitalist and when 
contracting problems are prominent.  
The overall costs of contracting, integral to 
alliance formation and operation including 
finding potential partners, writing contracts 
and ex-post bargaining, can be substantial. 
In the literature, venture capitalists, as 
sponsors of reputation (Stuart et al 1999), 
brokers of ideas (Gans and Stern 2003) and 
management experts (Gans et al. 2002), 
have mitigated the obstacles to 
collaboration (Hsu 2006) and risks from 
the environment (Wang et al. 2012). Wang 
et al. (2012) have emphasized that because 
of the scout and coach roles that venture 
capitalists perform, venture capitalists also 
impart the funded firms with legitimacy, 
and thereby reduce opportunistic behaviour 
through their censoring and “punishment 
of non-cooperative behavior” (Wang et al. 
2012).  
Venture capitalists and sharing equity in a 
joint venture can thus serve the same 
safeguarding purpose in alliances; they can 
both facilitate alliance formation and 
operation by reducing transaction costs and 
acting as a proper governance mechanism 
for contractual hazards in an inter-firm 
relation (Colombo et al. 2006; Wang et al. 
2012). The implicit assumption in the 
literature is that, although the reduction in 
transaction costs is never measured, 
changes in the transactions will be 
realigned with an efficient governance 
mechanism that reflects the level of risks 
(Sampson, 2004). We build upon these 
assumptions of transaction cost economics 
and propose that firms make a trade-off 
between the two types of capital, and either 
choose to use venture capital or to share 
equity in a joint venture, as alternative 
ways to reduce uncertainty. This gives rise 
to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1.  The likelihood of equity governance 
of an inter-firm relation is lower when one 
(or both) of the alliance partners is backed 
by venture capital. 
 
The problem of incomplete contracts and 
subsequent opportunistic behavior of 
alliance partners is applicable to 
established firms and start-up firms alike. 
Start-ups are like established firms 
assumed to engage in strategic alliances to 
fortify their competitive position (e.g. Park 
et al. 2002). Compared to established 
firms, however, start-ups lack the 
reputation, the experience, the network and 
the finance to mitigate the obstacles related 
to alliance formation (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1996). Start-ups may 
encounter higher transaction costs to find 
the right alliance partner and to mitigate 
hazards of leakage (Gulati 1998). They 
may also lack alliance capabilities and 
management skills to fully benefit from the 
strategic alliance. In the studies on venture 
capitalist’s involvement in alliance 
formation start-ups therefore figure 
prominently (e.g. Hsu 2006; Colombo et 
al. 2010; Wang et al. 2012). The start-ups 
in all these studies enjoy lower transaction 
costs due to VC involvement (Wang et al. 
2012). We will argue that the participation 
of venture capitalists in alliances involving 
start-ups may not only lower transaction 
costs for start-ups, but start-ups will need 
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to rely more on the reputation, the 
experience, the network and the finance 
offered by venture capitalists than 
established firms. Start-ups will, hence, 
trade off equity alliances for venture 
capital backing, thus treating these two 
types of safeguards as alternative ways of 
reducing transaction costs.  
 
H2.  VC-backed start-ups are less likely 
to choose equity governance in an inter-
firm relation than VC-backed established 
firms. 
 
The literature on venture capital 
involvement in alliance formation has also 
improved our understanding about the 
contribution of the type of VC 
participation to inter-firm collaborations. 
Authors in this field have found that the 
number of strategic alliances formed by a 
VC-backed firm is positively related to the 
amount of venture capitalists involved 
(Wang et al. 2012). This finding aligns 
with studies on syndication of venture 
capitalists.  
Syndication is a common practice among 
venture capitalists creating clusters of 
investors to share and hedge their 
investment decisions (Lerner 1994; Wright 
and Lockett 2003; Ferrary 2010; Hopp 
2010). These syndicates increase the 
assessment capabilities of the cluster of 
venture capitalists and signal a broader 
shared understanding of quality (Bygrave 
1987; Brander et al. 2002; Hsu 2006). A 
syndicate of venture capitalists also has a 
higher impact than a standalone VC, in 
terms of returns for the syndicate, but also 
in terms of safeguarding the alliance from 
hazards (Brander et al. 2002).  
Within a transaction cost perspective, the 
extended involvement of a VC syndicate 
may not only reduce the transaction costs 
but will also affect the governance of the 
inter-firm collaboration. The syndicate of 
investors may therefore replace the equity 
provided by partner firms in a joint 
venture.   
 
H3.  VC-backed firms are less likely to 
choose equity governance in an inter-firm 
relation when a larger number of venture 
capitalists backs the firms.  
 
 
3. Data collection and method 
3.1 Data collection 
The data was obtained by combining the 
SDC Platinum database of alliances and 
joint ventures for the years 2009-2014 with 
the database of VC-backed firms from 
Thomson One for the years 2005-2014. 
The SDC Platinum database has a wide 
coverage of industries and countries. 
Consistent with other existing databases, 
the SDC Platinum database also has biases 
and limitations (Schilling 2009). One of 
the biases of the SDC Platinum is a strong 
representation of bio- and high-tech 
collaborations in the database. For our 
purpose, i.e. the governance choice of VC–
backed start-ups, this industry bias may 
coincide with the industry focus of venture 
capitalists, and should thus be weighted in 
our final conclusions.  
We restrict our dataset to bilateral inter-
firm collaborations that were formed 
during the period of study. We therefore 
only include the ‘completed/signed’ 
alliances and joint ventures and exclude 
‘intended’ and ‘pending’ alliances and 
joint ventures. We also exclude from the 
SDC database all collaborations involving 
more than two partners, instances of 
undisclosed partners, and collaborations 
involving national governments, non-
commercial research institutes and 
universities. We limit the data to 
collaborations between firms, because the 
focus on venture capital and the transaction 
cost perspective may not extend the 
interpretation of our results to public 
governance decisions. This selection 
resulted in 5405 collaborations.  
Information on the VC-backed firms was 
obtained from Thomson One by selecting 
venture deals only. We manually searched 
for the names of all the alliance partners 
(taken from the SDC database) in 
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Thomson One, to determine whether the 
partners are backed by venture capital. We 
assume that the effect of venture capital 
backing on governance choices surrounds 
the announcement date of the 
collaboration, due to the preparation and 
implementation time of funding. The 
partners in the collaboration are coded as 
VC-backed when they receive venture 
capital in the year of the announcement 
date of the collaboration or any of the four 
years preceding the year of the 
announcement.  The period of four years 
was selected to make the possible impact 
that venture capital may have on 
governance choices comparable across 
years (Wang et al. 2012)
1
. Although VC-
backed partners may have been backed by 
venture capital before this 4-year period 
this was disregarded in the analysis, 
assuming a diminishing effect of venture 
capital on governance choice after a certain 
period of time. We have included the year 
of the announcement date of the 
collaboration as a cut-off point for venture 
capital backing, to allow for a maximum 
lag of 12 months in funding 
implementation, parallel to the governance 
choices made in the collaborations. We 
assume that when choices on inter-firm 
collaboration and funding by a venture 
capitalist occur in the same year, it is likely 
that firms consider the trade-off between 
capital of a joint venture or venture 
capitalist. 
In the exceptional cases of a VC-backed 
daughter of two allying parent companies, 
or of a VC-backed parent of an allying 
daughter, we excluded the first and 
included the latter. The reasoning adopted 
here, was that the daughter’s collaboration 
may benefit from a venture capitalist 
involvement with the parent but the 
parent’s collaboration will not benefit from 
                                                        
1 Wang et al. (2012) allow for a variable period between 
the time venture capital funding is received and the time 
collaborations are formed, with a minimum of four years 
for the final year. We have opted for a period of four 
years between venture capital funding and collaborations 
formed to exclude a time-bias in the VC-effect on 
governance choice. 
a VC-backed daughter firm. Furthermore, 
we focused on the venture capital backing 
of individual firms and excluded venture 
capital backing of collaborations as 
separate entities. 
 
3.2 Variables  
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable ‘equity 
governance’ refers to the governance 
structure of the inter-firm relation, and can 
be equity governance or governance in 
which no equity is shared. In order to 
include data on equity and non-equity 
governance structures, we combined two 
sets of data from the SDC Platinum 
database on inter-firm relations: one on 
joint ventures (collaborations in which 
equity is shared), and another on 
collaborations in which no equity is 
shared. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable, with 1 reflecting the choice for 
equity, and 0 reflecting the choice for a 
non-equity governance structure. Since the 
dependent variable is a binary variable, we 
use a binary logit model to estimate our 
results.  
 
Independent variables 
In our first model, we include ‘VC backing 
of alliance partners’ as an independent 
nominal variable. When only one of the 
two alliance partners is backed by venture 
capital, we coded the alliance as one-VC-
backed (OVB). When the two alliance 
partners are backed by venture capital, we 
coded the alliance as both-VC-backed 
(BVB). When the two partners are not 
backed by venture capital, we coded the 
alliance as no VC. We used the latter 
category as a base or reference category in 
the binary logit model, to determine the 
relation between VC backing and equity 
governance. 
In our second model we determine the 
influence of characteristics of VC-backed 
firms on their choice for equity sharing in 
an alliance. We constructed a subset of 564 
firms out of the 5405 alliances and created 
variables at the level of the firm. In the 
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subset, we only included alliance partners 
that were backed by venture capital. 
Thomson One provides information on 
different stages of funding by venture 
capitalists, which can be funding in seed, 
early, expansion or later stages. When 
firms received seed or early stage funding 
in the four years preceding alliance 
formation, we coded them as start-ups. 
When firms received funding in the 
expansion or later stages, we coded them 
as established firms. In model 2, we 
include ‘VC-backed start-ups’ as an 
independent binary variable. In model 2, 
we also include the ‘number of venture 
capitalists’ as an independent count 
variable. This variable reflects the number 
of venture capitalists that provided funding 
to the firm in the four years preceding 
alliance formation. 
 
Control variables  
The ‘industry of the alliance’ is a control 
variable in model 1, and we use SIC codes 
to measure this variable. SIC refers to the 
Standard Industrial Classification system 
that classifies industries by a four-digit 
code. The SIC codes are grouped into 10 
divisions (www.osha.gov), representing a 
collection of industries: division A is 
agriculture, forestry and fishing (codes 
0111-0971); division B is mining (1011-
1499); division C is construction (1521-
1799); division D is manufacturing (2011-
3999); division E is transportation, 
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary 
services (4011-4971); division F is 
wholesale trade (5012-5199); division G is 
retail trade (5211-5999); division H is 
finance, insurance, and real estate (6000-
6799); division I is services (7011-8999); 
and division J is public administration 
(9111-9721). We collected information on 
SIC codes from the SDC database, and 
used the primary SIC code of the alliance 
to determine the industrial division of each 
alliance. We include this control variable, 
because in some industries alliances are 
more often governed by equity  (Harrigan 
1988).  
The ‘continent of the alliance partners’ is 
also a control variable in model 1. The 
SDC database provides information on the 
country in which a firm that has entered 
into an alliance is located. We have 
combined this information on the country 
of the two partners to describe the 
continent in which the combination of 
partners is located. The categories of this 
variable include Africa, Asia, Australia, 
Europe, North America, South America, 
and a cross-continent category, with the 
latter category referring to two alliance 
partners that are located in different 
continents. We include this control 
variable, because in some continents, such 
as North America, alliance partners more 
often rely on contractual alliances and use 
less equity to govern the inter-firm relation 
(e.g. Beamish and Banks 1987). 
The ‘year of the inter-firm relation’ is a 
control variable in model 1. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity during the study 
period (2009-2014), we included a variable 
reflecting the year in which firms entered 
into the alliance (e.g. Lin et al. 2009; 
Reuer and Lahiri 2014).  
In model 2 we included the ‘industry focus 
of the venture capitalist’ as a control 
variable. Thomson One provides 
information on the industry focus of 
venture capitalists and offers three 
categories: venture capitalists with an IT 
focus, a medical focus or a non-high-tech 
focus. This industry focus refers to the type 
of firms that venture capitalists tend to 
invest in. We included a rest category 
‘other’ when Thomson One does not 
include a venture capitalist in one of the 
three categories. We expect that venture 
capitalists with an IT or medical focus may 
want to avert their portfolio firms to enter 
into an equity relation with another firm.
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Table 1. Definition of variables and summary statistics 
Variables Measurement 
Scale 
Frequency Min Max 
Equity 
governance 
Binomial No equity: 2965 
Equity: 2440 
0 1 
VC backing of 
alliance partners 
Nominal One partner is VC-backed: OVB: 510 
Both partners are VC-backed: BVB: 27 
No partner is VC-backed: NoVC: 4868 
1 3 
Industry of 
alliance 
Nominal Agriculture, forestry and fishing: 23 
Mining: 347 
Construction: 129 
Manufacturing: 1531 
Transportation, communication, electric, 
gas and sanitary services: 544 
Wholesale: 286 
Retail: 138 
Finance, insurance and real estate: 608 
Services: 1783 
Public administration: 16  
1 10 
Continent of 
alliance partners 
Nominal Africa: 33 
Asia: 906 
Australia: 78 
Cross-continent: 2163  
Europe: 533 
North America: 1660 
South America: 32 
1 7 
Year of alliance Nominal 2009: 721 
2010: 346 
2011: 795 
2012: 1362 
2013: 1532 
2014: 649 
2009 2014 
VC-backed 
startup 
Binomial VC-backed firms that did not receive 
seed/early stage VC: 379 
VC-backed firms that received 
seed/early stage VC: 185  
0 1 
Number of 
venture 
capitalists 
Count Number of venture capitalists that 
provide funding to a firm. 
Mean: 4.15 
1 21 
Industry focus 
of venture 
capitalist 
Nominal IT Focus: 73 
Medical Focus: 68 
Non High-Tech Focus: 33 
Other: 390 
1 4 
Industry of VC-
backed firm 
Nominal Agriculture, forestry and fishing: 1 
Mining: 2 
Construction: 1 
Manufacturing: 234 
Transportation, communication, electric, 
gas and sanitary services: 26 
Wholesale: 3 
Retail: 5 
Finance, insurance and real estate: 20 
Services: 269 
Public administration: 3 
1 10 
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Continent of 
VC-backed firm 
Nominal Africa: 1 
Asia: 104 
Australia: 10 
Europe: 91 
North America: 358 
1 5 
 
 
The venture capitalists may want to avoid 
that the new alliance partner gets 
proprietary access to valuable knowledge 
and technologies that are often developed 
in the medical and IT industries, and for 
which the venture capitalists have supplied 
the funding (Hsu 2006). We therefore 
include this variable as a control variable, 
as it may affect firms’ choice for equity in 
an inter-firm relation. In model 2 we also 
included the industry of the VC-backed 
firm and the continent of the VC-backed 
firm as control variables. These variables 
contain the same categories as in model 1, 
but are measured at the level of the firm. 
The industry and continent of the VC-
backed firm were introduced in model 2 to 
control for firm characteristics that may 
affect equity choice. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. 
Our sample of 5405 collaborations 
includes 2440 joint ventures, or 
collaborations in which equity is shared, 
and 2965 alliances in which no equity is 
shared. In 510 of these collaborations, one 
of the alliance partners received venture 
capital in any of the four years preceding 
the date of alliance formation. In 27 
collaborations, both alliance partners were 
backed by venture capital in the four years 
preceding alliance formation. Table 1 also 
provides information on three control 
variables (Industry of the alliance, 
Continent of the alliance partners, Year of 
the alliance) that are used in model 1 
relating VC backing of alliance partners to 
equity sharing in the collaboration.  
The number of observations in the subset 
of VC-backed firms is 564, including the 
510 firms that entered into an alliance in 
which they were backed by venture capital 
and their partners were not; and 54 firms 
that constituted the 27 collaborations in 
which both firms were backed by venture 
capital. 33 per cent of this subset are start-
up firms. The number of venture capitalists 
that backed the 564 firms ranges from 1 to 
21, with a mean of 4.15. 30 per cent of the 
venture capitalist(s) that provided funding 
to the firms in the subset have a specified 
industry focus. Table 1 also provides 
information on two other control variables 
(Industry of the VC-backed firm, 
Continent of the VC-backed firm) that are 
used in model 2. 
We tested our dataset and found that there 
is no problem with multicollinearity of our 
independent and control variables. The 
maximum variance inflation factor is 2.28, 
which is well below the recommended 
level of 10 (Kutner et al. 2005, p. 409). 
 
 
4.1 Main results 
 
Table 2 depicts the results of model 1 in 
which we relate VC backing of alliance 
partners to the governance of the 
collaborations. It shows that the odds of 
equity governance are 0.267 times lower 
for collaborations in which one of the 
firms is backed by venture capital, in 
comparison to collaborations in which 
none of the alliance partners are funded by 
venture capital. In addition, the odds of 
equity governance are 0.355 times lower 
for collaborations in which the two 
partners are backed by venture capital, 
again in comparison to collaborations with 
no VC-backed firms. The relations are 
significant at the 0.001% and 0.1% level, 
respectively. This result confirms 
hypothesis 1, in which we proposed that 
the likelihood of equity governance of an 
inter-firm relation is lower when one or
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Table 2. Regression results: Predicting equity governance of VC-backed alliances 
Model 1 Dependent variable: Equity governance 
Variables Coefficients/Odds ratios (standard errors) 
VC backing of alliance partners 
       - BVB 
       - OVB 
(Base category: NoVC)  
 
-1.035 / 0.355 (0.570)* 
-1.319 / 0.267 (0.130)****  
Industry of alliance 
       - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
       - Mining 
       - Construction 
       - Manufacturing 
       - Transportation, communications, electric, 
gas and sanitary services 
       - Wholesale 
       - Retail 
       - Finance, insurance and real estate 
       - Public administration 
(Base category is ‘Services’) 
 
2.258 / 9.567 (0.525)**** 
1.893 / 6.639 (0.144)**** 
1.971 / 7.177 (0.223)**** 
0.782 / 2.186 (0.079)**** 
0.961 / 2.613 (0.107)**** 
 
0.428 / 1.534 (0.139)*** 
0.628 / 1.874 (0.189)*** 
1.281 / 3.601 (0.104)**** 
1.247 / 3.480 (0.549)** 
 
Continent of alliance partners 
       - Africa 
       - Asia 
       - Australia 
       - Cross-continent 
       - Europe 
       - South America 
(Base category is ‘North America’) 
 
0.914 / 2.495 (0.376)** 
1.273 / 3.572 (0.095)**** 
0.848 / 2.336 (0.272)*** 
0.687 / 1.989 (0.075)**** 
0.744 / 2.105 (0.111)**** 
1.162 / 3.197 (0.407)*** 
Year of alliance 
      - 2010 
      - 2011 
      - 2012 
      - 2013 
      - 2014 
(Base category is 2009)  
 
1.163 / 3.199 (0.150)**** 
0.844 / 2.345 (0.115)**** 
0.379 / 1.461 (0.103)**** 
-0.006 / 0.995 (0.101) 
-0.164 / 0.847 (0.124) 
Constant  -1.661 / 0.190 (0.110)**** 
Model fit 
N=5405 alliances 
Nagelkerke R
2
 = 24.4% 
LR Chi
2
 = 1090.59**** 
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level; **** significant at 0.001 level.
  
both of the alliance partners is backed by 
venture capital. Table 2 also illustrates that 
collaborations in all industries are more 
likely to be governed by equity in 
comparison to collaborations that provide 
services. Inter-firm relations are less likely 
to be governed by equity governance when 
the partners are both located in North 
America. Inter-firm relations are more 
likely to be governed by equity in the years 
2010 until 2012, when compared to 2009. 
Table 3 shows the results of model 2 in 
which we relate characteristics of VC- 
backed firms to their choice for equity in 
an inter-firm relation
2
. The odds of a firm 
choosing equity to govern an inter-firm 
relation decrease by a factor 0.530 when 
the firm is a start-up. For each additional 
venture capitalist that supplies funding to a 
firm, the odds of the firm choosing equity 
to govern the collaboration are decreased 
by a factor 0.809, holding all other 
variables constant. The relations are 
                                                        
2 In model 2, the analysis is at the level of the VC-backed 
firm (and not at the level of the alliance as in model 1).  
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significant at the 0.05% and 0.001% level, 
respectively. These results confirm 
hypotheses 2 and 3, in which we proposed 
that VC-backed firms are less likely to 
choose equity in an inter-firm relation 
when they are start-up firms and when the 
number of venture capitalists that fund the 
firm increases. When firms are backed by 
venture capitalists that focus on funding 
non-high-tech ventures, the odds of 
choosing equity are more than 12 times 
higher, when compared to venture 
capitalists with another focus. VC-backed 
firms from the manufacturing industry 
have lower odds of choosing equity to 
govern their alliances when compared to 
VC-backed firms from the services 
industry.  
In addition to the interpretation of the 
results in terms of odds ratios, we also 
calculated predicted probabilities. These 
probabilities that, in our case, predict the 
use of equity governance are often easier 
to interpret than odds ratios (Hoetker 
2007). Figure 1 illustrates that the 
probability of choosing equity for start-ups 
that are backed by one venture capitalist is 
10 per cent lower when compared to VC-
backed established firms. 
 
Table 3. Regression results: Predicting choice for equity with characteristics of VC-backed firms 
Model 2 Dependent variable: Equity governance 
Variables Coefficients/Odds ratios (standard errors) 
VC-backed start-up -0.634 / 0.530 (0.310)** 
Number of venture capitalists -0.212 / 0.809 (0.055)**** 
Industry focus of venture capitalist 
       - IT Focus: 
       - Medical Focus: 
       - Non High-Tech Focus: 
 
(Base category is ‘Other’) 
 
0.068 / 1.070 (0.454) 
-0.369 / 0.691 (0.570) 
2.515 / 12.368 (0.447)****  
Industry of VC-backed firm 
 
       - Mining 
       - Manufacturing 
       - Transportation, communications, 
          electric, gas and sanitary services    
       - Wholesale 
       - Retail  
       - Finance, insurance and real estate 
 
(Base category is ‘Services’) 
 
 
1.519 / 4.566 (1.480) 
-0.515 / 0.598 (0.270)* 
-0.165 / 0.848 (0.611) 
 
0.623 / 1.865 (1.382)  
-0.011 / 0.989 (1.169) 
-0.572 / 0.564 (0.821) 
 
Continent of VC-backed firm 
       - Asia 
       - Australia 
       - Europe 
 
(Base category is ‘North America’) 
 
0.087 / 1.091 (0.357) 
-0.266 / 0.767 (1.123) 
0.255 / 1.291 (0.342) 
Constant  -0.777 / 0.460 (0.247)*** 
Model fit 
N = 558 VC-backed firms
a
 
Nagelkerke R
2
 = 13.4% 
LR Chi
2
 = 66.36**** 
* significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; *** significant at 0.01 level; **** significant at 0.001 level. 
a In this model the number of observations is reduced from 564 to 558 due to the lack of variation in the dependent variable 
for some categories of the control variables ‘industry of VC-backed firm’ and ‘continent of the VC-backed firm’. 
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When the number of venture capitalists 
that provide funding to firms is larger, the 
probability of choosing equity in an inter-
firm relation decreases, and even 
approaches zero at high numbers of 
venture capitalists. The latter holds for 
both VC-backed start-ups and established 
VC-backed firms. 
 
4.2 Robustness 
In order to test whether our results hold in 
different contexts, we have divided our 
sample of 5405 collaborations into two 
subsets, based on SDC activity 
descriptions of inter-firm relations: one 
subset of 885 R&D collaborations and a 
remaining subset of 4520 collaborations. In 
the first subset, inter-firm relations are 
included with an activity description 
“research and development” and “software 
development”. We test whether the 
negative relation between VC-backed 
collaborations and equity governance holds 
for the subset of R&D collaborations and 
the subset of non-R&D collaborations. We 
opted to focus on an R&D subset, because 
venture capitalists may find it especially 
problematic that a firm enters into a joint 
venture when the firm is investing a lot in 
R&D, and has received funds from the 
venture capitalists for its R&D activities. 
The inter-firm relation may lead to a 
transfer of valuable knowledge from the 
VC-backed firm to the new alliance 
partner, who may get ownership rights of 
the proceeds of this valuable knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities: Interaction of number of VCs and start-ups 
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Our results indicate
3
 that the results are 
similar for the R&D collaborations and the 
non-R&D collaborations. In both subsets, 
there is a negative relation between 
collaborations with one VC-backed firm 
and equity governance, and the relation is 
significant at the 0.001% level. The effect 
size is slightly larger for the R&D 
collaborations with an odds ratio of 0.18, 
compared to an odds ratio of 0.31 for the 
collaborations that do not pursue R&D.  
We also tested the effect of VC backing of 
firms in inter-firm relations on equity 
governance in different geographical 
regions. Most of the studies on venture 
capital and collaborations are restricted to 
North America (e.g. Lindsey 2008). In our 
sample, we have included collaborations in 
a variety of continents (see table 1). Our 
results show that there exists a negative 
relation between inter-firm relations with 
one VC-backed firm and equity 
governance in North America, Europe and 
Asia
4
, and these results are significant at 
the 0.001% level. Hence, our results are 
robust for different geographical regions. 
The effect size is the largest for Europe 
with an odds ratio of 0.05, and the smallest 
for North America with an odds ratio of 
0.30. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Our study has examined the impact of 
venture capital on the governance structure 
of collaborations involving start-ups. We 
first looked into the general case of VC-
backing and governance structures of 
collaborations and then focused on the 
governance choices of start-up firms 
among all VC-backed firms.  We 
subsequently looked at the influence of 
more than one VC, i.e. syndicated VCs, on 
governance structure. 
Previous research has confirmed that 
venture capital is instrumental in the 
                                                        
3 The results can be obtained from the authors. 
4 We did not test the relation for the continents Africa, 
Australia and South America, because of the limited 
number of observations for collaborations in these 
continents. 
formation of collaborations and has 
established a pivotal role of venture 
capitalists in mitigating external risks for 
inter-firm relations and reducing 
transaction costs. Studies in financial 
economics have also established an 
essential role for syndicates of venture 
capitalists in the formation of 
collaborations involving start-up firms.  
Incorporating the literature on inter-firm 
collaboration, in particular transaction cost 
economics, we have hypothesized that the 
reduction of transactions costs in the 
formation of collaborations through the 
involvement of venture capital may have 
an effect on the governance structure of the 
collaboration. We expected to see a trade-
off between equity supplied by partners in 
a joint venture and equity supplied by 
venture capitalists. We also expected this 
trade-off to be more pronounced in 
collaborations involving start-ups. 
Furthermore, we have hypothesized that 
the involvement of more than one venture 
capitalist, i.e. the syndication effect 
observed in the empirical financial 
literature, would also have repercussions 
on the governance structure of VC-backed 
firms. 
Our results present a better understanding 
of the effect of venture capital in alliance 
formation involving start-ups and the 
trade-off between joint venture equity and 
VC equity. We have observed a negative 
relation between VC-backed alliance 
partners and equity governance of the 
inter-firm relation. These results lend 
support to earlier studies demonstrating 
that venture capitalists and joint venture 
partners are used as substitutes for capital 
through their ability to mitigate risks 
(Wang et al. 2012). The trade-off is more 
pronounced for start-up firms and for firms 
that are backed by more VCs. 
Our results also indicate that this trade-off 
effect is relatively robust. Although 
previous studies have suggested that R&D 
collaborations are more susceptible to 
opportunistic behavior, due to the 
governance of intangible assets (e.g. Gulati 
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1995; Lindsey 2008), our results indicate 
only minute differences between R&D 
collaborations and non-R&D 
collaborations. Similarly, the trade-off 
between joint venture equity and VC 
equity is hardly affected by the 
geographical location of the collaboration. 
We suggest that venture capitalists are not 
only scouts, financiers and coaches of 
alliances (Baum and Silverman 2004) 
involving start-ups but also have a ‘liaison 
role’, by offering protection for firms 
against internal risks in a collaboration. 
Our results indicate that this role becomes 
even more substantial when syndication of 
venture capitalists is present. The predicted 
probability of choosing equity for VC-
backed start-ups and VC-backed 
established firms is lower with syndicates 
compared to funding by a single venture 
capitalist. With a large number of venture 
capitalists involved in the syndicate the 
predicted probability of choosing equity to 
govern a VC-backed collaboration is close 
to zero. When we compare start-ups to 
established firms, our results show that 
start-ups have a lower probability of 
choosing equity to govern collaborations 
with a low number of venture capitalists. 
This may be attributed to the lack of 
reputation, experience, networks and 
finance that differentiates the start-ups 
from established firms, and which leads 
start-ups to favor equity of a VC over joint 
ventures.   
The contribution of our study lies, 
moreover, in opening up new avenues at 
the intersection of the three streams of 
literature discussed above. One avenue for 
further research is to scrutinize the 
mechanism of the trade-off between joint 
venture equity and venture capital equity. 
More knowledge is needed on when firms 
decide to acquire funding from a venture 
capitalist, and when they decide to enter 
into a joint venture, and on how firms 
make this trade-off. Another avenue relates 
to further research on partner dissimilarity, 
in order to take into account more 
variables that explain the choice for equity 
governance in an inter-firm relation or the 
trade-off between venture capital and joint 
ventures. From a TCE perspective, firms 
choose equity to govern an inter-firm 
relation when there is a large amount of 
transaction uncertainty, which may be 
caused by differences between firms in 
terms of their industrial or technological 
background. When more variables are 
included that characterize the transactions 
between partners, future research will be 
able to disentangle the effects on 
governance that occur at the alliance 
formation and operation stages.  This type 
of research may provide more insights in 
how firms make a choice between the type 
of equity used in collaborations. 
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